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Phusis and Nomos in Aristotle’s Ethics
By Thornton C. Lockwood, Jr.1 2
SAGP at Eastern Division, American Philosophical Association, New York, 2005
The relationship between nature and normativity in Aristotle’s practical philosophy is problematic. On the 
one hand, Aristotle insists that ethical virtue arises through the habitual repetition of ethically good actions, and thus 
no one is good or virtuous by nature. Phusikê aretê or “natural virtue” is more like cleverness (demotes) than
prudence (phronêsis) and it can result in wrong actions.^ Yet on the other hand, at times Aristotle appears to use 
nature to justify normative claims. Thus, in the Ethics Aristotle distinguishes between natural and unnatural 
pleasures, and he claims that what is truly good is that which is pleasing by nature to the spoudaios or excellent man; 
in the Politics he claims that all deviant regimes-types are contrary to nature {paraphusin) and that for equals to
have unequal shares is contrary to nature, and nothing contrary to nature is noble or fine.3 4*67In such instances, the use 
of “by nature” or “contrary to nature” point to the end or perfection of human nature. Thus the problem with 
Aristotle’s use of the notion of nature in his practical philosophy is that in some instances what is natural seems to be 
ethically neutral, but in other instances it seems to set the standard for human perfection.
Modern Aristotle exegetes have sometimes argued that Aristotle must, consciously or not, be using the term 
“nature” in at least two different senses here. To use the language of Julia Annas, when Aristotle talks about “natural 
virtue” in the sense of the talents or abilities which one possesses from birth, he has in mind the notion of “mere 
nature,” but when he discusses the perfections which a virtuous individual enjoys by his or her nature, Aristotle has
in mind the notion of nature as an “ethical ideal.”4 There is nothing unusual about Aristotle using the same term in 
several different senses, and of course he devotes an entire book of his Metaphysics to distinguishing the different 
senses of various philosophical concepts, including a chapter which discusses the different senses of phusis relevant 
to theoretical investigation.^ Nonetheless, in the case of the notion of nature in the Ethics, one can sympathize with 
Annas’ observation that “it is a pity that Aristotle does not explicitly mark the difference.”^
I would like to suggest an alternative solution to the problem of reconciling Aristotle’s different senses of 
nature in his Ethics. In Nicomachean Ethics V.7, Aristotle claims that political justice {to dikaion politikon)
possesses a “natural” {phusikon) pail and a “conventional” {nomikori) part7 In response to those who separated 
nature and convention and disparaged the latter because it was different from place to place, Aristotle claims that 
both nature and convention admit of variation, and his language suggests that the two are ultimately parts which need
1 Fordham University, Department of Philosophy, Collins Hall, 441 E. Fordham Road, Bronx, NY 10458, USA. 
Email: lockwood@fordharn.edu
2 EN II. 1.1103a 17-26; VI. 13.1144b4 ff; cf. V.1.1129a 12-17. Citations from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics derive 
from the Greek text of Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea, ed. I. Bywater (Oxford, 1894). In the Politics, Aristotle points 
out that although other animals live primarily according to nature, humans are able to act “contrary to acquired habits 
and nature {para tous ethismous kai tên phusin) because of reason {logos) {Pol VII.12.1332b3-8; cf. EN
X.9.1179b20-31). Citations from Aristotle’s Politics derive from the Greek text of Aristotelis Politico, ed. W.D.
Ross (Oxford, 1957).
3 EN VII.5.1148bl5-20; IX.9.1170al3-15; Pol III. 17.1287b41-42; VII.3.1325b7-10.
4 J. Annas, Morality o f Happiness (Oxford, 1993) pp. 142-58 and “Ethical Arguments from Nature: Aristotle and 
After,” in Beiträge zur antiken Philosophie, ed. H.C. Gunther and A. Rengakes (Stuttgart, 1997), pp. 185-97. See 
also T. Irwin, Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics (Indianapolis, 1985), pp. 416-17; F. Miller, Nature, Justice and Rights 
in Aristotle Politics (Oxford, 1995), pp. 44-45.
3 Meta V.4.1014bl6-15al9; cf. Phy II.1.192b8-3a9. I discuss below the relevance of Aristotle’s theoretical account 
of nature in his practical works.
6 Annas, Morality o f Happiness, p. 147.
7 tou de politikou dikaiou to men phusikon esti to de nomikon {EN V.7: 1134b 19-20).
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to be interwoven or combined. Scholars who have struggled with Aristotle’s apparently disparate senses of the idea 
of nature have assumed that nature is an ethical ideal which can be separated from and serve as a guide for that which
is merely conventional.^ I argue that when Aristotle invokes what is “natural” as a norm, he does so under the 
assumption that the natural component of a norm is ultimately separable from its conventional part only in 
abstraction. Just like the syllable “BA” is not reducible to the letters “b” and “a,” but instead is a whole greater than 
its two parts, political justice is a composite unity of nature and convention which, in unifying the two parts,
transforms them.9
To defend my solution to the problem of the apparently inconsistent senses of nature which Aristotle uses in 
his practical philosophy, I first survey the different ways which Aristotle uses the terms phusis and nomos (and their 
cognates) in his Ethics. Although it is true that Aristotle distinguishes between “mere nature” and “ethical nature,” 
there is a third relevant sense of nature at play in the Ethics, namely that which is usual or universal, and it is 
necessary to explain the place of generalizations about human nature within the Ethics. Second, I show that the 
different sense of phusis and nomos are in fact interrelated through an examination of Aristotle’s account of ethical 
habituation, since it is the laws and customs of a society which transform mere nature into ideal nature. Third, I 
argue that the account of phusis and nomos in EN V.7 illustrates how the two concepts are entwined into a composite 
unity. Although Aristotle may never explicitly distinguish the different senses of nature in his Ethics, right in the 
center of the Ethics he does explain the relationship between phusis and nomos, and I argue that EN V.7 is proof that 
he does not conceive of nature as a source of positive normativity independent from convention. Finally, in my 
conclusion I claim that when nature is isolated from custom, it only supplies prohibitions about what is forbidden 
rather than guidance about what one should do.
PART I: THE DIFFERENT SENSES OF PHUSIS AND NOMOS IN THE ETHICS8 910 1
Although scholars have ably distinguished different clusters of meanings of the terms nomos and phusis in
Aristotle’s writings, it is desirable to build upon past analyses of the terms for two reasons. * * First, opposing “mere 
nature” to “ideal nature” obscures the fact that there is a relevant third sense of nature at work in the Ethics, namely 
the sense in which nature indicates what is “usual” or for the most part. Nature, in this sense, is closely related to the
8 See, for instance, J. Roberts, “Justice and the Polis,” and F. Miller, “Naturalism,” in the Cambridge History o f 
Greek and Roman Political Thought, ed. C. Rowe and M. Schofield (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 345-46, 321-43. Annas 
goes so far as to claim that ideal nature “can point beyond convention and existing institutions... We can appeal 
beyond them to the idea of human nature as it would be if we did not have those practices and institutions” 
(“Arguments from Nature,” pp. 196-97).
9 Cf. Ateto VII. 17.1041 bl 1-33.
in my survey of the senses of phusis and nomos I have focused primarily upon the way the terms are used in only 
the Nichomachean Ethics, with occasional illustrations from the Politics and the Eudemian Ethics. Scholars have 
wondered whether the sense of nature in the Politics is the same as that which is found in the Ethics, and it is beyond 
the scope of this paper to examine that question in a detailed fashion. (See further Annas, Morality o f Happiness, 
pp. 149-58; G.E.R. Lloyd, “The Idea of Nature in the Politics,” in his Aristotelian Explorations [Cambridge, 1996], 
pp. 184-204; and K. von Fritz and E. Kapp, “The Development of Aristotle’s Political Philosophy and the Concept 
of Nature,” in Articles on Aristotle, vol. 2, Ethics and Politics, eds. J. Barnes, M. Schofield, and R. Sorbaji [London, 
1977], pp. 113-34.) Further, the use of phusis and nomos in the Rhetoric and the Magna Moralia is markedly 
different at crucial points (see especially MM  1.33.1195a 1 ff. and Rhet. 1.13.1373b 1 ff.; cf. F. Miller, “Aristotle on 
Natural Law and Justice,” in A Companion to Aristotle's Politics, eds. D. Keyt and F.D. Miller [Cambridge, 1991], 
pp. 282-89; M. Salomon Shellens, “Aristotle on Natural Law,” Natural Law Forum 4 [1959]: 72-100; and M.
Hester, “Aristotle on Change in Justice in the Nicomachean Ethics,” Skepsis 12 (2001 ): 181 -92). For a survey of the 
use of nature in EN and EE, see J.F. Balaudé, “Nature et norme dans les traités éthiques d’Aristote,” in Aristote et la 
notion de nature, ed. P.M. Morel (Bordeaux, 1997), pp. 95-129.
11 See further T. Irwin, Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, pp. 416-17; cf. H. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicum (Berlin, 1961), 
837al8-52, 488b24-489a26. In the Ethics Aristotle uses the various cognates of phusis in several additional senses, 
for instance, to indicate “individual” natures, the methodological “natures” of the different disciplines, and even the 
sense of nature as a personified force of the cosmos. Grant discerns at least six different senses of the term phusis in 
the Ethics {Ethics o f Aristotle, 4th ed., [London, 1885] vol. 1, pp. 483-84).
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senses of nature in the Physics, and although Aristotle appeals to such generalizations about human nature in the 
Ethics, he keeps such observations separate from the sense of “ideal nature,” although they sometime overlap the 
sense of “mere nature.” Second, a survey of the use of the term nomos in Ethics shows that Aristotle unifies two 
senses of nomos which to a modern ear are distinct and perhaps even antithetical. For Aristotle, nomos is both 
morally regulative or impartial law and what is customary, and although he was aware that things which are “merely 
legal” are not necessarily just, what is customary takes on a normative force. Thus, in my survey of these five senses 
o fphusis and nomos I lay the ground both for a reply to the claim that Aristotle mistakes what is usual for what is 
ideal and for an explanation of why phusis and nomos must be brought together since ethical habituation according 
to nomos (in both the senses of what is lawful and what is customary) is what transforms mere nature into nature as 
an ethical ideal.
LA) ARISTOTLE'S USE OF “PHUSIS”
I.A.l) Phusis as an object of scientific inquiry
The first use of phusis, sometimes expressed as phusikôs or “in the fashion of one who is a natural 
philosopher (hophusikos),” points to a methodological approach to understanding ethics and politics which appeals 
to general principles of natural science or observations based on what is usual or commonplace in human nature. 
Thus, in his accounts of akrasia and friendship, Aristotle will speak about an account or cause which is phusikôs or
phusikôteron, and what he has in mind is an account that appeals to the faculty psychology of De A n im a l  
Concerning the nature of friendship, Aristotle considers the beliefs of phusikoi—his name for writers such as
Heracleitus or Empedocles *3—who explain friendship by general principles such as Strife or “the Like,” although he
dismisses such accounts as foreign (ouk oikeia) to his inquiry. 4^ The Ethics also appeals to a central notion of the 
Metaphysics, namely, that “this is natural: that which is potential is revealed in its actuality in its function (ergon)” 
and it employs the concept of actuality (energeia) in the definition of the human good, the account of God, and the
definition of pleasure. ^
One can also find instances where Aristotle appeals to what is usual or “for the most part,” similar to the 
notion of phusis as an internal cause (aitia) of motion which acts for the most part in a uniform fashion, much like
the account of nature found in the second book of the Physics At times Aristotle also directs his auditor to 
“physiological” (phusiologos) investigations. For example, Aristotle appeals to such inquiries to explain how the
ignorance of an intoxicated person dissipates or how bodily organs respond to intense sensations. ^ 7 Aristotle appeals 
to generalization about human nature which appear to be based in a sort of moral psychology or science of human 1234567
12 EN VII.3.1147a24, IX.9.1170al3; cf. IX.9.1167b29. Cf. DA I.1.403a28, De sensu I.436al7, Meta VI.1.1026a5. 
Although Aristotle claims that the politikos—to whom the Ethics and Politics are directed—must have some 
knowledge of the soul, it is interesting to note that the tripartite psychology of the Ethics is inconsistent with 
Aristotle’s criticism of soul division in De Anima (EN 1.13.1102a29-bl4, III. 10.1117b23-25, VI. 1.1139a4-16,
VII.6.1149a25-30. Cf. DA 1.4: 41 Ic30-b5, III.9: 432a22ff). See fiirther P.A. Vander Waerdt, “Aristotle’s Criticism 
of Soul Division,” American Journal o f Philology 108 (1987): 627-43 and “The Peripatetic Interpretation of Plato’s 
Tripartite Psychology,” Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 26 (1985): 283-302.
13 See Phy 1.2.184b 17,1.3.186a20,1.4.187al2,28.
14 EN VIII. 1.1155b8-9; cf. EE VII. 1.1235al0, Pol 1.5.1254a31, II.8.1267b23-29. The account of Hippodamus 
borders on satire.
15 £ 7 /IX.7.1168a9-10,1.7.1098al6-17, VII.12.1153al4-15; cf. I.6.1096a20-3.
16 EN II. 1.1103a 18-24, III.3.1112a32-4, V.8.1135b21-3; cf. EE II.8.1224al8, VII.2.1238al4, VIII.2.1247a31, Phy 
II.1.192612-15, II.8.198b34-99al. Cf. J. Owens, “Nature and Ethical Norm in Aristotle,” in Aristotle The Collected 
Papers o f Joseph Owens, ed. A. Catan (Albany, 1981), pp. 164-68. Some have found in Aristotle’s account of ós epi 
to polu or “for the most part” the basis for a science of ethics, but nonetheless one that is a practical rather than 
contemplative science. See further E. Winter, “Aristotle, hos epi to polu relations, and a demonstrative science of 
ethics,” Phronêsis 42 (1997): 163-89; and C.D.C. Reeve, Practice o f Reason Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 
(Oxford, 1992); cf. M. Nussbaum, “Rational Animals and the Explanation of Action,” The Fragility o f Goodness 
(Cambridge, 1986), pp. 264-89.
17 EN VII.3.1147b8-9, VII.14.1154b8.
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nature. For example, Aristotle claims that “nature appears to avoid what is painful and to aim at what is pleasant”; 
“all things love and choose existence (to einai)”·, “life (zôê) is good by nature... it is itself good and pleasant (as 
appears likely from the fact that all men desire it)”; and “natural” desires are those common to all humans, e.g., that
for food.
Is nature, as understood by the phusikos, relevant to practical philosophy? The question is important 
because scholars such as Julia Annas have claimed that sometimes Aristotle confuses nature in the sense of what is
usual with nature in the sense of an ethical ideal. ^  Although the Ethics shares the conceptual resources of 
Aristotle’s scientific works and appeals to generalizations about human nature, it is fundamentally wrong to view the 
Ethics as based in Aristotle’s natural science or to mistake what is usual for what is ideal. As noted above, Aristotle 
himself distinguishes his inquiries from those of the phusikoi, and generally rejects them as irrelevant to the question 
at hand. Both within the Ethics and elsewhere in his writings Aristotle distinguishes the practical science of ethics, 
which is concerned with action or doing, from the contemplative sciences of metaphysics and physics, which are
concerned with knowledge for its own sake.2^ Although at times Aristotle’s ethical inquiries encroach upon those in 
the contemplative works, for instance, in his critique of the Platonic notion of the Good, even there Aristotle 
dismisses such a metaphysical investigation “to some other branch of philosophy in which it is more at home” 
(I.6.1096b30-2). Further, it is also possible for contemplative and practical sciences to provide different analyses of 
the same phenomenon. Aristotle’s account of soul division in the Ethics is different from the one in his De Anima, 
and he sees no problem with their inconsistencies.2 1
Aristotle’s generalizations about human nature provide a canvas, as it were, on which practical philosophy 
depicts a human ideal, but at least in the Ethics Aristotle does not confuse what is usual for what is ideal. Aristotle 
acknowledges certain generalizations about human motivations and desires, but they do not determine what is right 
and wrong. For instance, human nature is more inclined to some excesses or deficiencies rather than others, but that
simply means on a practical level we must be on guard against some departures from the mean rather than others.18 *202 
There are limits to what human nature can endure, but that does not change the notion of what is voluntary; rather, is
concerns what is excusable or not blameworthy.2  ^ Although human nature is not sufficient to pursue contemplation 
without interruption since we need bodily health and food, that should serve as no impediment to seeking
immortality through the mind.24 Thus, although it would be wrong to say that ethical philosophy is conceptually 
independent from the other Aristotelian sciences, including a sort of ethical anthropology, nonetheless it differs from 
the natural sciences in its aims and methods. The object of investigation—what the Ethics calls hê peri ta 
anthrôpina philosophia (X.9.1181M5-16)—may be the same, but the orientation of the contemplative and practical 
sciences are fundamentally different.
I.A.2) Phusis in the sense of “mere nature”
18 £N VIII.4.1157bl6-17, IX.7.1168a6-7, IX.9.1170b 1-2, 1170a26-8, III.11.1118b8-l I; cf. Pol III.6.1278b25-30, 
EE 1.5.1216al 1-14.
Annas, “Arguments from Nature,” pp. 192-94.
20 MetaW. 1.1025b 19-29,1.2.982M 1-28, EN 11.2.1103b26-9, III.3.112a21-bl2, VI.7.1141b2-23, X.9.1179a33-b4; 
cf. EE 1.5.1216b 11-19. See further, J. Frank “Citizens, Slaves, and Foreigners: Aristotle on Human Nature,” 
American Political Science Review 98 (2004): 91-104.
21 Indeed, in De Anima, Aristotle claims that the natural philosopher and the dialectician can give alternative and 
non-contradictory accounts of anger: the former defines anger as “the surging of blood and heat around the heart” 
(identifying material aspects of the phenomenon) and the later defines it as “desire for retaliation” (identifying its 
form or eidos). DA I.1.403a29-b3; cf. EN VII.6.1149a25-33. See further P. Aubenque, “La definition 
aristotélicienne de la colère,” Revue Philosophique 147 (1957): 300-17.
22 £NII.8: 1109al2-18, II.9: 1109b2-10; cf. III. 11.1119a6-8, III. 12.1119a22-34.
23 £7/111.1.1110a23-29, 1110b9-17. Aristotle notes that “natural desires” (phusikai orexeis) are “more pardonable,” 
and congenital bodily defects are not blameworthy (EN VII.6.1149b4, III.5.1114a22-30, V.8.1136a5-9,
VII.5.1148b31-4).
24 ENX.SA  178b32-l 179al, X.7.1177b34-35; cf. VI.7.1141a33-41b2, VII.14.1154b22-32.
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The second relevant sense in which Aristotle uses the notion of nature in the Ethics indicates the notion of 
what Annas has called “mere nature,” namely the incomplete “temperament” of a young man still capable of
development.^^ In this sense of the term, Aristotle famously notes that ethical virtue is not by nature since it requires 
habituation and that virtue cannot be a dunamis or capacity, since we are not called “good” or “bad” according to 
things we receive from nature.^  Although Aristotle notes that intellectual virtues such as nous, gnomê and sunesis 
are thought to be by nature, no one is a sophos by nature.·^ Aristotle’s clearest illustration of “mere nature” arises in 
his juxtaposition of natural virtue (phusikê arete) and complete or “sovereign” virtue (kuria arete). Natural virtue is 
like the spirited courage or ferocity of a cornered animal motivated by pain: it appears to be courage, but since it 
lacks choice (proairesis) and is not according to what is noble (dia to kalon), it is only an approximation of complete
courage or sovereign v irtue.^  To use another example, natural virtue is like cleverness (deinotês): it is an ability to 
pick the most efficient means to an end but it does not speak to the goodness or badness of that end.29 Although 
such natural characteristics may be congenital, they also include those characteristics which arise at a certain age of 
life. Height and complexion are characteristics of “mere nature,” but so too is the process of aging, the graying of
hair, or the attainment of judgment or understanding.3^ In sum, although characteristics which humans possess in 
the sense of “mere nature” are not without value, people are not blamed or praised for such qualities, and such
qualities do not necessarily result in virtuous actions.3 ^
I.A.3) Phusis in the sense of “ideal nature”
The third and final sense in which Aristotle uses phusis in the Ethics indicates the good functioning or end
of a human being.32 Thus, when Aristotle claims that man is a “political animal” or a “household animal” by nature, 
he indicates the conditions necessary for the good functioning of an individual, viz., that he or she live in a 
community with family, friends, and fellow citizens, but he also indicates that we have impulses which make us
amenable to such conditions.25 6*8933 For instance, the coupling instinct or urge—which according to the Politics is not 
done “from choice” (ouk ek proaireseôs [1252a28]) but rather is by nature—leads men and women into a procreative 
union of husband and wife and thus makes the household “natural” in the sense of “mere nature”; but unlike other 
animals, humans couple not only to continue the species, but also because of utility, pleasure, and even, in some
cases, to seek a virtuous other who can serve as a second self.34 “Natural” does not mean “usual” or commonplace, 
but rather, it means “normal” in the sense that it indicates the norm or end which only rare examples will actually
25 Aristotle invokes such a notion by the use of the adjective phusikos, the use of phusis in the dative or genitive, 
and the impersonal use of phuô in the perfect, all of which can indicate that something is “by nature.”
26 EN 11.1.1103al9, II.5.1106a9. Natural virtue is almost identical with “bodily virtue” (EN 1.12.1101bl7-18,
X.8.1178al4-16, EE III.7.1234a23, Λ7Λ7Ι.34.1197b36-98a22).
22 EN VI. 11.1143b6-8; cf. I.3.1095a3-4, VI.8.1 !42al3-21.
28 EN III.8.1116b23-27, 31-33, 1 1 17a4-9, VII.13.1153b28-30; cf. EE III. 1.1229a28.
29 EN VI.13.1144b3 ff; see also V.1.1129al 1-23, VIII.13.1162b35.
3P EN V .l 1.1143b.8-10, V.8.1135a34-b3; cf. EE 1.1.12H a l6-18. EE defines the natural (tophusei) as “what 
accompanies everybody as soon as he is born or else what comes to us if development is allowed to go on regularly, 
for example, gray hair and old age” (II.8.1224b33-5).
21 In EN III. 5 (1114b7 ff.) Aristotle considers the possibility that someone could be bom with a sort of “moral 
vision” which made him good by nature (euphês). He rejects such a scenario because it implies that virtue and vice 
are involuntary (1114b 13-14). Cf. EE VIII.2.1247a2 ff.
22 in his account of the human good in EN 1.7, Aristotle asks whether there is a human function (ergon) or if humans 
instead are “by nature functionless” (all’ argonpephuken [1097b29-30]). As Annas points out, oddly enough the 
rest of Aristotle’s discussion in EN 1.7 makes no explicit use of the notion of “ideal nature” (Annas, Morality o f  
Happiness, p. 144).
33 EN 1.7.1097b 11, VIII.12.1162al7, IX.9.1169bl8; ££.VII.10.1242a24; Pol I.2.1253a3-4, 8-9, III.6.1278b20. For 
the multiple senses in which Aristotle uses the term “political animal,” see D.J. Depew, “Humans and Other Political 
Animals in Aristotle’s History o f  Animals,” Phronêsis 40 (1995): 156-81.
34 Pol 1.1.1252a28; £ 7 /VIII.12.1162al6-27.
SAGP Newsletter, 2005/6. 2, p. 28
reach.33 Thus, there are “mere nature” impulses of love within the household between parent and offspring or 
husband and wife, but it does not follow that most or many families exhibit such bonds or that such bonds will
develop into healthy family relations independent of societal norms.36 When Aristotle claims that the polis exists by 
nature he is not making a sociological generalization about the universality of poleis in the world, but rather, he is
asserting that the polis is a specific kind of community in which an individual can achieve human perfection.3^
Nature, in this third sense which indicates good human functioning, is also closely related to Aristotle’s 
doctrine of pleasure. Aristotle defines pleasure as the unimpeded activity or end (telos) of a state according to its
nature (energeia tés kataphusin hexeôs)?^ Again, just because pleasure is in a sense “according to nature” or a 
“natural state” it does not follow that it is in any way universal, and Aristotle explicitly notes that although all people
pursue pleasure, they hardly pursue the same pleasure and few pursue the best pleasures.39 Rather, the excellent man 
(ho spoudaios) sees what is true in the case of the noble and the pleasant, and is, as it were, “the standard and
measure” (kanôn kai metrori) of such things.4® Things which are “pleasant by nature” are things which “are pleasant 
to lovers of what is noble”; more generally, unqualified goods (hâplôs tagatha), are truly good only to one who is
able to take pleasure in their essentially or naturally pleasant qualities/* * For instance, although Aristotle claims that
children are a natural source of delight and joy to a parent, it is possible to love a child to excess or unhealthily.4^ 
Rather, things which are good or pleasant “by nature” need to be desired in the proper fashion, and so Aristotle 
claims that since the good man, insofar as he is good, is the measure of each thing, then “what appears pleasures to
him will also really be pleasures, and what is pleasant will be what he enjoys.”3 *6789413
The virtuous man feels pleasure because virtue itself has a “nature,” albeit one which is rare and the result 
of inculcation. Aristotle’s discussion of virtue illustrates a slightly different sense of “ideal nature,” namely the sense 
in which certain things have “essences” or characteristics according to which something is known “in itself’ (kath
hauto) rather than accidentally (kata sumbebêkos).44 45The “nature” of ethical virtue is closely related to the doctrine 
of the mean since ethical virtues are “natural constituted (pephuken) to be destroyed by excess and deficiency,” and
it is virtue which preserves ethical principles.43 The nature of virtue cannot be “mere nature,” because it is not the
33 Annas claims that Aristotle confuses this point in his account of slavery in Politics I, but as I have shown in my
account of the natural scientific sense of phusis, he usually keeps what is natural and what is usual in the Ethics
distinct (“Ethical Arguments from Nature,” pp. 192-194).
36 See EN VIII. 1.1155a 17-20, VIII. 12.1161M6-34, VIII.11.1161al8, VIII. 12.1162al7, X.9.1180b7. Indeed, 
Aristotle explicitly denies that non-Greek families possess such “natural bonds” and even Greek families in 
Aristotle’s best regime will need the guidance of extensive legislation to function “naturally” (Pol I.2.1252b5-9, EN
VIII. 10.1160b28-33). For the breakdown of such family bonds, see EN VIII. 10.1160b28-l 161a9, VIII.14.1163b23- 
25. See further my “Justice in Aristotle’s Household and City.” Polis 20 (2003)” 1-21.
37 Pol I.2.1252b31-53a3; cf. Annas, “Ethical Arguments from Nature,” pp. 191-92.
38 £W VII. 12.1153a 12-16, VII.14.1154bl6-18; cf. VII.l 1.1152bl3, VII.12.1152b33-53a2, X.3.1173b9-11.
39 EN VII. 13.1153b28-30; cf. X.2.1172b9-18.
4® £7/111.4.1113a29-b2. See further P. Gottlieb, “Aristotle and Protagoras: The Good Human Being as the Measure 
of the Goods,” Apeiron 24 (1991): 25-46.
41 £7/I.8.1099a7-15; £ 7 /VII.4.1148a24-36; cf. EN  V.1.1129b4, V.9.1137a26-31, VII.12.1152b25-8,
IX. 9.1169b21-3, 1170a2-3; cf. £ £  VII.5.1239b38, DA III.10.433b7-10.
42 EN VII.4.1148a28-30, VII.5.1148bl5-18. Aristotle also believes that there are “unnatural” bestial pleasures 
which can result from disease, habits, or morbidity (VII.5.1148b 17-20, VII.6.1149b28-30).
43 ΕΝΧ.5Λ  176al7-19; cf. Pol VII.13.1332a23-25.
44 EN VII. 14.1154b 16-18, IX.9.1170a26-8 with 1170bl-2;cf. EN 1.13.1102M3, VI.1.1139al0-12, EE 
VIII.3.1248b27-40, 1249a25, Pol II.2.1161 a26, IV. 11.1296b25.
45 E N II.2.1104a 11-18, II.3.1104b20-21, II.6.1106a25-6, VII.8.1151al5-20; cf. EE 1.5.1216a39; see also EN 
V.5.1134114-16, V.10.1137b26-27.
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result of natural development, but rather, it appears almost like a “second nature.”4*^ Indeed, at one point, when 
considering the possibility of rehabilitating the akratês or unrestrained man, Aristotle comes close to describing 
virtue as a second nature, although oddly enough he does so in the words of the Sophist Eueneus. Aristotle claims 
that those who are unrestrained as the result of habit {ethos) are more easily cured than those who are so by nature 
{phusei), since habit is more easily cured than nature; “but the reason why habit is also difficult to change is that it is 
like nature (têiphusei eoiken), for as Eueneus says, ‘Habit, I say, is long time training {melete), my friend, and in the
end training is nature [phusis) for human beings.”46 7 *50123Mere nature and ideal nature appear to be on a continuum, and 
to understand their relationship we need to examine Aristotle’s notion of nomos which allows one to move from the 
former to the latter.
I.B) ARISTOTLE’S USE OF “NOMOS"
I.B.I) Nomos in the sense of “impartial law”
Aristotle uses the term nomos in two frustratingly similar, interrelated, but distinct s e n s e d  First, Aristotle 
means by nomos what we mean by “law,” viz. a general (perhaps even universal) norm promulgated by a nomothetês
or law-giver, and one which in many respects appears to be impartial and regulative.4^ Thus, Aristotle famously 
claimed that “the law is reason without desire” (aneu orexeôs nous ho nomos estiri) and one of the reasons why he 
ultimately champions the rule of law over the rule of men is because many men are bad judges when their own
interests are at play.50 Throughout the Politics “rule of law” indicates the characteristic of a regime in which the
laws rather than men are sovereign.5 1 Aristotle is aware that laws are general rules and the problem of equity 
{epieikeia) arises because laws do not speak to specific cases, but rather, as universal statements, they must be 
applied to particular instances.^2 At one point, Aristotle claims that a slave is human insofar as he or she can share in
law or contract (sunthêkê).53 Finally, Aristotle uses an adjective derived from nomos, viz. to nomimon or the 
“lawful,” to indicate that which aims at the common good. Thus, in his analysis of justice as “complete virtue” or the 
unity of virtue in relationship to others, Aristotle claims that “the just is the lawful {to nomimon)”; that “all lawful 
things {ta nomima) are somehow {pôs) just”; and that “nearly all lawful actions {tapolla ton nomimôn) are those 
produced by the whole of virtue, for the law {nomos) orders living according to each virtue, and prohibits living
46 See further M. Bumyeat, “Aristotle on Learning to be Good,” in A.O. Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics 
(Berkeley, 1980), pp. 69-92. J. McDowell has developed this notion further within a neoAristotelian framework: 
see, for instance, his “Two Sorts of Naturalism,” in Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 167-97.
47 EN VII. 1.1152a27-33; cf. MM.II.6.1203b31 -2, Rhet 1.11.1370a6-7, Prob. 879b36-880a5, 949a28-9. In De 
memoria, Aristotle writes that “ôsper gar phusis êdê to ethos” (II.452a27-8), but that appears to be the closest that 
Aristotle comes to claiming that habit is a “second nature.” See further, P.M. Morel, “L’habitude: une seconde 
nature?” in Aristotle et la notion de nature, ed. P.M. Morel (Bordeaux, 1997), pp. 131-48.
4  ^R. Kraut notes that “we should realize that the Greek term that is translated as ‘law’—nomos—covers not only the 
enactments of a lawgiver or a legislature, but also the customs, norms, and unwritten rules of a community. The 
noun nomos is cognate to the verb nemein, one of whose senses is ‘to believe’. Whatever conduct a community 
believes to be fitting—its proper and customary way of doing things—constitutes the nomoi of that community” 
{Aristotle Political Philosophy [New York, 2002], p. 105).
49 For the most extended discussion of nomos in Aristotle’s thought, see D. Weirnick, “Law in Aristotle’s Ethical- 
Political Thought,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University, 1998.
50 Pol III. 16.1287a33; cf. III.9.1280al5-17, III.15.1286al6-20, 34, III.16.1287b4-5; ÊiVX.l 180a22-23.
51 See Pol IV.4.1292a3-32, IV.5.1292b5-7, 11-22, IV.6.1292b27 ff, IV.8.1294al-10, IV.10.1295al5-17,
IV. 12.1296b35-40.
52 £7V V.7.113515-8, V.10.1137bl3-34, Pol II.8.1269a9-14, III.15.1286a8-10; cf. to psêphisma, EN V.7.1134a23,
V. 10.1137b27-8, Pol IV.4.1292a4-7.
53 e n  VIII. 11.1161b5-8; cf. Pol I.5.1254b23-4,1.13.1259a28-9, 1260a 11-14. See further my “Is Natural Slavery 
Beneficial?” Journal o f the History o f Philosophy, forthcoming.
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according to each evil.”54 Clearly, Aristotle here is using the term nomos and its cognate to nomimon in these 
passages to indicate a regulative universal norm.55
I.B.2) Nomos in the sense of “custom”
Second, Aristotle also uses the term nomos, and more specifically, the adjective to nomikon, to mean that
which is “customary,” “conventional,” and that which appears to be opposed to nature.56 Although I will examine 
Aristotle’s discussion of the opposition of phusis and nomos below, he cites or alludes to the opposition of “nature 
and convention” approximately a dozen times in his ethical and political writings. For instance, Aristotle reports that 
some people think that the subject matter of ethics and politics, ta kala kai ta dikaia, is only a matter of convention 
rather than by nature, and some people have claimed that slavery is wrong because it exists only by convention rather
than by naturel7 Sometimes Aristotle uses nomos to indicate “legality” or what is only sanctioned by law, and so is
just only “accidentally.’^  But consider the following passage from the Ethics:
Is it possible to do injustice (adikein) to oneself or not? . .  . There exist some just things which are 
those in accord with every virtue and prescribed by the law (hupo tou nomou). For instance, the 
law (ho nomos) does not allow one to kill oneself, and that which it does not allow is forbidden.
(fiV V.l 138a4-7)
As Stewart pointed out long ago (and has been followed most recently by Gauthier and Jolif), the notion of nomos 
here must be more than mere “law” or “convention,” for it includes universal societal norms such as the taboo
against suicide.5® Although the “conventional” (to nomikon) part of political justice is described as “that which in 
the beginning (ex arches) makes no difference if it is one way or the other,” Aristotle notes that once it is laid down, 
then of course it makes a difference and possesses normative force, presumably independent of whether it is in 
accord with natural right (V.7.1134b20-21). It may be purely arbitrary, ex archês, whether the British drive on the 
left or the right, but it is surely unjust and indeed dangerously irresponsible to ignore such “conventional justice”
once it has been established.^® Although Aristotle wrote that law is nous without desire, he also claimed that “law
has no power to force obedience (pros to peithesthai) save through the force of custom (to ethos).”^ * 54678*1
54 E N V A A  129a34, 1129bl2-14, V.2.1130b22-26; cf. V.7.1135a6, V.10.1137bl2-14, X.9.1180b4. See also Pol 
II.8.1268b42-la, V.3.1303a22, VII.2.1324b27, VII.2.1325al 1. For interpretation, see Kraut, Aristotle Political 
Philosophy, pp. 111-18.
55 Although Aristotle believes that the notion of law includes generality and impartiality, he also believes that the 
notion of law is posterior to the notion of regime-type or unwritten constitution (politeia). Thus, in the Politics 
Aristotle claims that laws should be promulgated to fit the regime-type, and “not the regime-type made to fit the 
laws” (Pol. IV.1.1289al3-14; cf. III.10.1281a35-39, III.l 1.1282b7-13).
56 See EN V.9.1136b34, VIII.13.1162b23-5; EE VII. 10.1242b32, a7, VII. 10.1243a5, 14.
57 EN I.3.1094M5-16, Pol I.3.1253b21; cf. EN V.5.1133a30, 1 133b21, V.7.1134b 18 ff., MM  1.34.1194b32, Po/1.4. 
1254al3-15,1.5.1254M9-21, 1255al, I.6.1255bl3-16, III.6.1278b33, Soph Elen 12: 173a7-18, 29-30. Aristotle also 
distinguishes between justice which is “unwritten” (agraphon) and “according to law,” although it is unclear if this 
distinction maps on to that between “convention and nature” (EN VIII.13.1162b20-23, ££.VII.10.1242b33, Rhet. 
1.13). See further M. Ostwald, “Was There a Concept of agraphos nomos in Classical Greece?” in Exegesis and 
Argument, ed. E.N. Lee (Assen, 1973), pp. 70-104.
58 See especially EN V.9.1137al0-13; cf. III.8.1116al9-20, VI.12.1144al5, VII. 10.1152a21-24.
5® J.A. Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics o f  Aristotle (Oxford, 1892), vol. 1, p. 533; cf. Gauthier and J.Y. 
Jolif, L ’Éthique à Nicomaque, 2nd ed. (Paris-Louvain: 1970), t. 2, pp. 423-24.
6® Kraut writes “the fact that this form of justice rests to some degree on an arbitrary selection of one rule rather than 
another does not undermine the importance of abiding by the convention that is in force in one’s community. It 
would be absurd to argue that since some of the practices of one’s city are uniquely correct, but are just only by 
convention; one need not abide by them. Such an argument would ignore the obvious fact that there are great 
advantages in having a common way of interacting with each other, despite the initial arbitrariness involved in 
conforming to this rather than that scheme of expectations” (Political Philosophy, p. 128).
61 £o/II.8.1269al7-19; cf. III.16.1287b5-9, IV.5.1292bl4-22; EN VI.2.1139a36.
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The fact that Aristotle uses the same term to indicate two concepts which we usually oppose should alert us 
that not only does Aristotle understand nomos differently from the Sophists who opposed nomos to what was 
eternally invariable; his account places significant trust upon the extent to which longstanding community beliefs 
carry within themselves normative guidance. Given Aristotle’s remarks about things like slavery and his
intellectualist account of virtue, it is clear that Aristotle hardly endorses the status quo.62 But perhaps unlike some 
modern viewpoints, he is not inherently hostile or suspicious of customary norms.
PART II: Ethical habituation: Mere nature, nomos, and ideal nature
The sense of nomos as “custom” points to Aristotle’s central way of interrelating mere nature, law, and 
nature as an ethical ideal, namely, through his account of ethical habituation. As noted above, nature as an “ethical
ideal” provides the model of an individual who naturally takes pleasures in unqualified or “absolute” goods.63 Such 
a person loves and hates the right things and possesses a native goodness (eugenês) and love of the noble
(philokalos).64 As Plato properly noted, according to Aristotle, right education (orthêpaideia) consists in enjoying 
and being pained by the correct things from one’s youth onwards, and Aristotle seems to think that such a condition
arises either through nature (phusei), through habit (ethei), or through teaching (didaxê(i)).^  But even a person with 
such a noble nature is not fully virtuous: Aristotle only claims that such a person is amenable to the exhortation
(protrepsasthai) of virtue, but he is still only like the properly tilled soil capable of nourishing a seed.66
How is one to prepare such rich and nutrient soil? In his dialectical treatment of ethical habituation in EN
X.9 Aristotle first considers the claim that such preparation should take place within the oikia or household. But he 
notes that
On the one hand, paternal instruction {patrikê prostaxis) has not the power to prevail and compel; 
and neither, in general, does any one man unless he is a king or of such a soil. Law (nomos), on the 
other hand, has the power to compel, and further, it is reason (logos) which arises from a sort of 
practical wisdom and mind. (X.9.1180a 19-23)
Aristotle then considers the claim that ethical habituation should take place in the realm of the city. Although he 
endorses the claim that “community attention” (koinê epimeleia) is best, at least according to the Politics, the only
community that ever gave any public attention to its young was Sparta, and they inculcated the wrong goals.67 Thus, 
for individuals who live in defective regimes, “it seems fitting for each individual to promote the virtue of his 
children and his friends... and from what we have said, it seems he will be better able to do so if he acquires the 
legislative science (nomothetikê [X.9.1180a34-35]).” Although Aristotle endorses “private education” in the 
household, such a household appeals to both the natural bonds and affections that exist between parent and child and
the model of legislative enactments and customs (ta nomima kai ta ethê) of the city.68 Ethical habituation transforms 6234*78
62 On the radical reforms implied by Aristotle’s doctrine of slavery, see Newman, Politics o f  Aristotle (Oxford, 
1887), vol. 1, pp. 151-52; On the radical reformation that Aristotle gives to traditional Greek virtues, see H. North, 
Sophrosyne (Ithaca, 1966), p. 211.
63 EN IX.9.1170a 14; cf. £7/I.8.1099a7-15, III.4.1113a29-b2, V.1.1129b4-7, V.9.1137a26-31, VII.4.1148a23-48b5, 
VII.12.1152b26-28, X.5.1176a8-29; Pol VII. 13.1332a20 ff.; DA 111.10.433b9. See further Burnyeat, “Aristotle on 
Learning to be Good,” pp. 69-92 and I. Vasiliou, “The Role of Good Upbringing in Aristotle’s Ethics,” Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): 771-97.
64 £7 /X.9.1179b25-26, 8-9; cf. £7/111.5.1114b6-8, VI.13.1144b34, EE VII.2.1237a6, VIII.2.1247a38, b22, b39.
63 EN II.3.1104b 12-14; on Aristotle’s three means of becoming good, see EN X.9.1179b20-31, Pol VII. 13.1332a30- 
35, 39-41, b3-8; cf. EN 1.7.1098b2-4,1.9.1099b9-11, £ £  1.1.1214a 15-28. See further J. Swanson, “Aristotle on 
Nature, Human Nature, and Justice,” in Action and Contemplation: Studies in the Moral and Political Thought o f 
Aristotle, eds. R.C. Bartlett and S.D. Collins (Albany, 1999), pp. 225-47.
66 EN X.9.1179b7-l 1,26-27; cf. EN 1.4.1095b5-13.
67 EN X.9.1180a29-30; X.9.1180a25-6, Pol II.9.1271M-7, VII.2.1324b5-9, VII. 13.1333b5 ff. It should be noted 
that the accuracy of Aristotle’s remarks about Sparta are disputed. For a thorough review of the literature, see E. 
Schütrumpf, Aristoteles Politik Buch 11 und Buch 111 (Berlin, 1991), pp. 283-98.
68 £ 7 /X.9.1180b3-7; cf. EN VIII. 10.1160b23 ff., Pol I.13.1260b8-21.
SAGP Newsletter, 2005/6. 2, p. 32
“mere nature” into nature as an “ethical ideal” within the natural household but according to the model of the 
legislator. No doubt after the preparation of such a noble nature, there will be further extensive guidance by the 
nomoi and customs of one’s city, and Aristotle spends almost the entire last book of the Politics considering the 
nature of such paideia. But even within the household, an organization which arises from impulses which originate in 
“mere nature,” Aristotle incorporates a virtual legislator. Conceptually, one can distinguish the different senses of 
phusis and nomos at play in such a realm, but the successful head of household ultimately has to interweave and 
combine them together.
PART III: EN V.7 AND THE INTERRELATION OF PHUSIS AND NOMOS
In the first part of my paper I proved through an analysis of Aristotle’s different uses of the term phusis that 
nature in the sense of what was usual or what was undeveloped is distinct from nature in the sense of an ethical idea; 
further, my analysis of the senses of nomos proved that Aristotle blends together two senses of norms which we keep 
distinct, namely that which is normative and that which is customary. In the second part of my paper I proved that 
phusis and nomos are interrelated by explaining how nomos—both in the household and in the city—transforms 
mere nature into ethical nature. It remains to be said how phusis and nomos are interrelated.
In E N V .7 Aristotle responds to an unnamed interlocutor who argues that since that which is natural (to 
phuskion) has everywhere the same validity (dunamis) but that what is legal (to nomikon) changes from place to 
place, it follows that all justice is changeable (1134b24-27). Aristotle responds that
This is not so, though in a way it is so. With us, though presumably not at all with the gods, there is 
such as a thing as the natural, but still all is changeable (kinêton mentoi pan)·, but there is such a 
thing as what is by nature (phusei), and what is not by nature (mê phusei). What sort of thing, 
among those that admit of being otherwise, is natural, and what sort is not natural, but legal and by 
convention (nomikon kai sunthêkê(i)), if both natural and legal are changeable (eiper amphô kinêta 
homoiôs)? It is clear in other cases also,69 and the same distinction will apply; for the right hand, 
for instance, is naturally superior, even though it is possible for everyone to become ambidextrous.
The sorts of things that are just by convention and expediency are like measures. For measures for 
wine and for corn are not of equal size everywhere, but in wholesale markets they are bigger and in
retail smaller. 70
The overall point of Aristotle’s response is clear: whereas the Sophistical interlocutors set up a false dichotomy 
between invariable nature and variable customs, Aristotle claims that both nature and convention are variable. 
Aristotle’s discussion in EN V.7 has been much disputed, but for the purpose of my argument I wish to focus on how
it illustrates the interrelation of nature and conventional
The opening sentence of V.7— tou de politikou dikaiou to men phusikon esti to de nomikon (1134b18- 
19)—asserts that what is natural and what is conventional or legal are parts within political justice (rather than as was
the case with the Roman jurists who divided ius naturale and ius positivum within /mí),72 but Aristotle’s response to 697012
69 Irwin follows MS Gamma, contra Bywater, and reads “...eiper amphô kinêta homoiôs. Delon <de> kai epi ton 
allôn <kai> ho autos harmosei diorismos” (1134b32-33).
70 EN V.7.1134b27-35a3. T. Irwin translation, slightly emended (Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, 2nd ed. 
[Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1999]). For a recent analysis of the textual problems of this passage, see G. 
Romeyer Dherbey, “La question du droit naturel,” in L 'excellence de la vie. Sur l ‘Éthique à Nicomaque et l ’Éthique 
à Eudeme d ’Aristote, eds. G. Romeyer Dherbey and G. Aubry (Paris, 2002), pp. 125-37.
71 An exhaustive account of debate about EN V J  can be found in P. Destrée, “Aristote et la question du droit 
naturel (Eth. Nie., V,10, 1134b 18-1135a5),” Phronêsis 45 (2000): 220-29. I am much indebted to Destrée’s 
analysis.
72 See T. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, trans. C. I. Litzinger (Notre Dame, 1993), 
§§1016-17. See also J. Roberts, “Justice and the Polis,” pp. 345-46; and F. Miller, “Aristotle and Natural Law,” pp. 
287-88. Tony Bums has argued that unlike the bipartite tradition of Stoic natural law, which views positive and 
natural law in a “vertical” relation in which the latter is the basis or ground of the former, Aristotle incorporates the 
natural and conventional parts of political justice in a “horizontal” relation in which nature and convention are 
interwoven (“Aristotle and Natural Law,” History o f Political Thought 19 [1998]: p. 148).
SAGP Newsletter, 2005/6. 2, p. 33
his interlocutors makes clear that both parts must be variable. Aristotle’s use of examples in EN V.7 suggests that 
although the two parts of political justice can be isolated in abstraction, to view either part separately from the other 
or to characterize the variability of either part differently is the source of his interlocutor’s misleading opposition of 
nature and convention. On the surface (and as his interlocutors would claim) Aristotle’s examples—what sort of 
animal to sacrifice to a god, the amount necessary to ransom a prisoner, right-handedness, and differences in retail 
and wholesale measurements—appear to be one-sided instances of the nature/convention divide: right-handedness is 
an instance of what nature entails “for the most part,” liturgical details of worship are simply the result of convention 
and history. Along the lines of such an argument, the interlocutor wishes to point out that natural practices are 
invariable, whereas conventional practices vary from city to city, and indeed, vary historically within the same city.
But at a deeper level both such one-sided examples exhibit the interweaving of nature and convention.73 As 
readers of Plato’s Laws know, the universal naturalness of right-handedness is hardly a fore-gone conclusion. The 
Athenian stranger claims that humans are naturally ambidextrous, and only become right-handed or left-handed 
through habituation.74 Further, as Pierre Aubenque has noted, the different measurements in retail and wholesale 
illustrate that the natural and the conventional are intertwined. Such measurements are like translations in that it is
contingent in which language a translation takes place, but it is necessary that it be in a language.7$ The same is true 
of the other examples: as Strauss suggests, there is hardly anything merely “conventional” underlying the duties of 
“helping fellow citizens in misfortune into which they have fallen in consequence of performing a civic duty, and
worshipping the gods by sacrifice.”^  Aristotle’s examples at first glance appear to illustrate the transitory and 
arbitrary character of convention, but closer examination of the ones which he furnishes point to such central facets
of society as the basis of commerce, language, religious worship, and civic duty.73 4567 in sum, whereas Aristotle’s 
interlocutors obscured the character of political institutions by falsely opposing nature and convention, Aristotle’s 
characterization of nature and convention as parts of political justice makes clear how both parts are mutually 
dependent and equally variable.
I propose that the clearest way of interpreting the relationship of nature and convention derives from the 
model of hylomorphic wholes which Aristotle discusses in his Metaphysics. Aristotle insists that substance can be 
understood either as form or as matter but also as the composite of the two {Meta VII. 17.104 lb 11 if.). But such a 
composite is not a “heap,” rather it is a unified whole in which matter and form mutually determine one another. To 
provide an example from De Anima: a human being is a composite of soul and body, but the nature of human soul
(which is the form of the body) is not such that it could be instantiated in any material b o d y .78  Rather, a human soul 
needs a body which possesses things such as eye jelly, a spinal cord, a heart and so forth. Further, not just any soul 
could “activate” a human body: the material component of the unity strives for form, but the form, to exist, requires 
the body. To use the example from the Metaphysics, the syllable “BA” (namely, the noise a sheep makes) is not a 
disjointed “heap” of its constituent elements; separately, the letters “b” and “a” could never produce the noise which
73 R. Sharpies finds evidence for a similar view in Alexander’s Mantissa, which contains an article entitled “That 
justice is by nature {hoti to dikaion phusei).” See R. Sharpies, “An Aristotelian Commentator on Justice,” in C. Gill, 
ed., Virtue, Norms and Objectivity (Oxford, 2005), pp. 287-88.
74 Laws VII.794a5-795d5; cf. Pol II.12.1274bl2-15. Aristotle discusses right-handedness elsewhere in his 
biological treatises: see PA III.3.665a22-6, IV.8.684a32-bl; IA 4.706a9 ff, 5.706bl2-16, 19.714b8-14; HA 
II.1.497b31-2, II.17.507al9-24. See further Miller, “Aristotle on Natural Law and Justice,” pp. 289-92; and more 
generally, G.E.R. Lloyd, “Right and Left in Greek Philosophy,” Journal o f  Hellenic Studies 82 (1962): 67-90.
75 Cf. De Inter 2 .16a27-30, 4.16b30-35. “Plus généralement” Aubenque writes, “les règles sont arbitrarles . . .  
n’ayant d’autre justification que les coutumes locales, mais il est nécessaire (et ‘naturel’) qu’il y ait des règles 
assurant chaque fois l’égalité, l’isonomie dans les rapports humains.” See “La loi chez Aristote,” Archives de 
Philosophie du Droit 25 (1980): p. 155. Cf. H. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd ed. rev., trans. J. Weinsheimer and 
D. G. Marchall (New York, 1989), pp. 312-24.
76 Strauss, “On Natural Law,” International Encyclopedia o f the Social Sciences (New York, 1968), vol. 2, p. 83.
77 Kraut points out that a question as serious as whether the exposure of normal infants should be prohibited is also a 
matter of legal justice in the Politics {Pol VII.16.1335M9-25; see Aristotle Political Philosophy, p. 128, fn. 33).
78 DA I.1.403a3-25,1.3.407bl3-27, II.1.412bl-13alO.
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the syllable produces. The composite unity of the syllable is composed of two elements or parts but the unity 
transforms the elements. I suggest that political justice is an analogous unity of two elements or pails, namely nature 
and convention. Just like one can abstractly discuss the nature of the human soul or the letter “b” in isolation from a 
living human or the syllable “BA,” one can identify aspects of political justice which are “natural”; but there is no 
such thing as “natural justice” existing independent of political justice any more than there are human souls which
can exist independent of bodies (at least for Aristotle).79
Although one does not wish to collapse Aristotle’s position into that of the Sophists, it is worth noting that 
his engagement with them is more muted in emphasis than that of Socrates or Plato given that it was historically not
at first hand and that his own ultimate position incorporated but transcended their opposition of phusis and nornosß^ 
In his Sophistical Refutations Aristotle condemns the nomos!phusis antithesis as a “commonplace rule that makes 
men utter paradoxes,” and suggests that it is based on an antiquated understanding which claimed that all that was 
according to nature was true and everything according to law was the opinion of the many.81 Of the two other 
citations of the nomos/phusis antithesis outside of EN V.7 in the entire Ethics, one is primarily an etymological point 
about the term nomisma (1133a30), and the second points out, probably only an endoxon, that the subject matter of 
the study of politikê— ta kala kai ta dikaia—admit of difference and change, so that they seem to be by convention,
not by nature (ôste dokein nomô einai, phusei de mê [1.3: 1094b 16]). ^  Simply put, Aristotle’s opposition to 
Sophistical thought in his ethical-political philosophy finds its locus classicus elsewhere than the nature/convention 
antithesis.83 7980123
79 My interpretation builds upon one advanced by Richard Bodéüs, who argues that Aristotle’s account of political 
justice is an “interpretative jurisprudence” which contains formal and material elements. The formal principle of 
right distinguishes correct and deviant regimes, although its requirement—that a regime aim at the common good 
(see Pol III.6.1279a 17-22)—can be fulfilled in a variety of different constitutions (namely, monarchy, aristocracy, 
and polity). The material principle is the “hypothesis” or underlying principle of a regime (e.g., freedom in a 
democracy or wealth in an oligarchy [see Pol IV. 1: 1288b28, II.9: 1271 a42, VI. 1: 1317a40]) on which each regime- 
type is based and reformed, although it is only normative for the regime-type of which it is a material principle. See 
further R. Bodéüs, “The Natural Foundation of Right and Aristotelian Philosophy,” in Action and Contemplation: 
Studies in the Moral and Political Thought o f Aristotle, eds. R.C. Bartlett and S.D. Collins (Albany, 1999), pp. 73, 
78, 82; cf. P. Aubenque, “The Twofold Natural Foundation of Justice According to Aristotle,” in Aristotle and 
Moral Realism, ed. R. Heinaman (Boulder, 1995), pp. 43-44.
80 Guthrie writes that one must “issue a caveat against speaking o f ‘Plato and Aristotle’ in one breath, as if their 
opposition to sophistic empiricism were equal and identical. On the subject in which the Sophists were primarily 
interested, Aristotle’s standpoint was in many ways closer to theirs than to Plato’s.” W.K..C. Guthrie, The Sophists 
(Cambridge, 1971), p. 53; cf. V. Johnson, “Aristotle on Nomos," Classical Journal 33 (1938): 353.
81 Soph Elen 12: 173a6-19. See further B. Yack, Problems o f a Political Animal (Berkeley, 1993), p. 144.
82 Aristotle’s use of the infinitive (rather than the indicative) in his result clause (ôste dokein) appears to weaken the 
force of his claim even further since it indicates only a general result rather than an actual outcome. See further 
Smyth, Greek Grammar (Cambridge, 1920), §§2257-60.
83 The alleged opposition of phusis and nomos is more pronounced in the first book of the Politics where Aristotle 
examines the naturalness of the city and slavery, but although consideration of that text goes beyond the scope of my 
inquiry, I believe that Aristotle’s account of the city and slavery in fact support my claim about the interrelation of 
nature and convention, because he underscores in Politics I that the city and slavery (properly understood) are just 
both by nature and by convention. See Pol 1.2.1252b3 l-53al with 1253a30-36; Pol 1.4.1254a 14 with I.6.1255a3 ff., 
I.7.1255b36-38, and I.8.1256b23-28. See further D. Dobbs, “Natural Right and Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery,” 
Journal o f Politics 56 (1994): 69-94. Although it would be the object of another study to locate the precise issue 
upon which Aristotle distinguishes his position from that of the Sophists, within the Ethics his objection seems to be 
against the lack of seriousness with which they address the problems of education and reform: see EN II.4: 1105b6- 
18,V.8: 1137a4-26 and X.9 in toto (which has traditionally been understood as a reply to Isocrates’ Antidosis)·, cf. 
Aristotle’s apparent response to Thrasymachus, EN V. 1:1130a3-5, V.6: 1134b4-6. See further F. Heinimann, Nomos 
und Physis, Herkunft und Bedeutung einer Antithese im grieschischen Denken des 5. Jahrhunderts (Basel, 1965) 
and G.B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 111-130.
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CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF NATURE AS A NORM
Rather than ascribe to Aristotle a doctrine of ethical or political naturalism, I believe that Aristotle 
combines phusis and nomos much in the same way that in his contemplative works his doctrine of hylomorphism 
combines form and matter. In part I of this paper I examined the various components of this combination throughout 
Aristotle’s Ethics, and in part III illustrated how such a combination takes place in the case of ethical habituation: a 
father makes use of both the natural bonds which he has with his children and the legislative science to transform the 
“mere nature” of a youth to the “ideal nature” or philokalos ready to enter into the larger world of the polis. The 
relationship between phusis and nomos is mutually dependent: as the household nomothetês, a father has to use a 
different regimen for each of his children according to their “innate” temperaments, but the molding of temperaments
is also guided by the regime in which one lives.84 *Finally, in part III of the paper, on the basis of Aristotle’s claim 
that the conventional and the natural are variable parts of political justice, I have argued that the best model for the 
relation of these parts is derived from the organic hylomorphism of Aristotle’s treatment of substance.
What then is one to make of the relationship between normativity and nature in Aristotle’s Ethics? I believe 
that although Aristotle thought nature gave hints about what is right and what is wrong, ultimately those hints are
underdetermined in isolation from custom and social norms.8  ^Nonetheless, Aristotle at times appears to base 
normativity on nature because nature provides guidance about what is wrong without specifying in turn what is right. 
For instance, Aristotle’s account of the mean relative to us is indeterminate with respect to the right course of action 
since the mean will differ from individual to individual and from context to context. Nonetheless, there are certain 
emotions and actions—pleasure in another’s misfortune, shamelessness and envy or adultery, theft, and murder—
which do not admit of excess and deficiency but are always wrong.8^ The case of regime-types is similar. Although 
Aristotle claims that all deviant regimes are contrary to nature, it does not follow that nature indicates what is the
best regime. 87 Just because one may know that a tyranny like Nazi Germany is intrinsically wrong because of the 
very nature of government, it does not follow that there is an equally obvious “opposite” of Nazi Germany that is 
intrinsically right. Just because it is contrary to nature, and so not noble or fine, for those who are equal to have an 
unequal share in government, it does not follow that nature unambiguously delineates who in fact is equal and
unequal (cf. Pol VII.3.1325b9-10).88 Isolated from nomos, phusis is indeterminate and only capable of issuing
prohibitions.8^
84 E N X.9.1180b6-13, Po/I.13.1260b8-21.
8  ^ Perhaps the clearest expression of the problem arises in the account of the natural slave. Aristotle writes: “The 
intention of nature is to make the bodies also of freemen and slaves different—the latter strong for necessary service, 
the former erect and unserviceable for such occupations, but serviceable for a life of citizenship . . .  though as a 
matter of fact the very opposite comes about—slaves have the bodies of freemen and free men the souls only . . . .  If 
this is true in the case of the body, there is even more just reason for this rule being laid down in the case of the soul, 
but beauty of soul is not so easy to see as beauty of body” (Pol I.5.1254b27-55al; cf. Plato, Symp 210b).
8^ EN II.6.1106a3 l-b8, 1107a9-18. I am grateful to Richard Cobb-Stevens for suggesting this point to me.
87 Pol III.17.1287b39-41. At EN V.7.1135a5 Aristotle claims that there is one regime which is everywhere best by 
nature, but he never indicates what that regime is, and it is questionable whether or not it corresponds with the city of 
one’s prayers discussed in the last two books of the Politics. But it is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate 
the problems involved with the assertion at 1135a5. See further my “The Best Regime of Aristotle’s Ethics" 
(unpublished).
88 Cf. W. Newman, The Politics o f Aristotle, vol. 1, pp. 19-21.
8^ I am grateful to J.J. Mulhem for commenting on an earlier draft of this paper.
